The entire report is also available if you'd like some light bedtime reading. It sounds like it was a failure of management and quality control at multiple levels. Of complete end-to-end verification of navigation software and related Inconsistent communications and training within the project, and lack These contributing causes include inadequate consideration of theĮntire mission and its post-launch operation as a total system, Project and its prime mission contractor, was inadequateĪlso in the high level report is this quote: the process to verify and validate certain engineering requirements and technical interfaces between some project groups, and between the.Navigational characteristics, or the process of filing formal anomaly personnel were not trained sufficiently in areas such as the relationship between the operation of the mission and its detailed.the small mission navigation team was oversubscribed and its work did not receive peer review by independent experts.some communications channels among project engineering groups were too informal.Mars-bound spacecraft from a group that constructed it and launched it Was not robust enough, exacerbated by the first-time handover of a the systems engineering function within the project that is supposed to track and double-check all interconnected aspects of the mission.errors went undetected within ground-based computer models of how small thruster firings on the spacecraft were predicted and thenĬarried out on the spacecraft during its interplanetary trip to Mars. The board cited a number of contributing factors, which I have filtered to include the ones most relevant to the question: NASA formed a board to investigate the loss of the spacecraft and reached some high level conclusions.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |